Residuals: How the hell did we get here?
Former WGA executive Grace Reiner gives us the history of residuals and clarifies a lot.
ANDY BOBROW: Hi and welcome back to the trenches. In our last substack, we talked about all the different residual formulas and how they play out in real life. And then we were contacted by Grace Reiner, who was a negotiator for the Writers Guild and was involved in the creation of a lot of these residual formulas. Grace offered to come shed light on how they became what they are, and answer a bunch of questions about the whole topic. So welcome, Grace. I’m really glad we’re doing this. I’m not even sure where to start, but how about you tell us what your involvement has been?
GRACE REINER: Thanks. I came to the WGA as a law clerk while I was still in law school. After I graduated, I was asked back and ran Screen Credits for about 6 years, left the WGA to work in feature production for a little while, then came back to the WGA to run the Contracts Department. The Contracts Department answers questions about the WGA agreement (known as the MBA -- minimum basic agreement) and provides information to members, companies and the negotiators, and I became interested in how all of the parts fit together. I got involved in doing research and drafting proposals for the MBA negotiations and participated in bargaining from 1993 to 2006 (by then, I was an Assistant Executive Director in charge of enforcement of the MBA). With others, I drafted and negotiated the separated rights provisions, the creative rights provisions and many of the economic provisions for each new MBA, including the residuals provisions. My habit was to do as much research as possible into the bargaining history of provisions we were negotiating, so we were as prepared as possible to respond to their arguments, so I am also aware of the history of many of the provisions. I enforced the new basic cable residuals when they were put in the MBA and personally wrote the provisions that turned Fox into a network (it was paid as other than Network prime time before then). I now work at a television production company, not in Labor Relations, but in production, and I believe the companies should do everything they can to comply with the union agreements. Luckily, my employer agrees.
ERIC TIPTON: First off, Grace, thank you so much for helping us understand this stuff. It’s obviously incredibly complex and there are a lot of moving parts, and it leads me to a few separate – well, I hope they will be questions. So I’ve been in the Guild since ‘96 starting in features (now I do TV as well but I don’t staff) and have a pretty good track record of getting things sold, but an awful track record of getting things made. As a result, I have yet to really benefit from “mailbox money”, so I don’t pay a ton of attention to the various formulas, or how we arrived at them. I’m also sure there are many younger writers out there who have only worked, perhaps in “mini-rooms”, or at least exclusively on shows made for streaming and they see their green envelopes and can’t imagine how previous generations could actually live on these checks when, today, they’ll barely buy lunch. Then there is the other end of the spectrum, where you’ve got older writers who started in broadcast and are now living through the streaming era, who have watched as residual income went off a cliff. The business model now seems to be very badly broken for everyone but the corporate overlords and the media conglomerates and tech companies that now own Hollywood so my questions are these:
Historically, how did we get here? Where did these formulas come from, how were they arrived at? In other words - how did things get this bad and are they really as bad as they seem?
Is there some arcane legal/labor mechanism that would prevent us from negotiating an entirely new participation model for creators – one that could potentially also benefit the people we work with – actors, directors, any craft union who now receives residuals – rather than take the table scraps we’re offered, we kill the whole system and build a new one? Or are the formulas so connected to other aspects of the MBA that taking it apart and starting over really isn’t possible?
If #2 were possible, what might that look like?
If it isn’t (and realistically, I can’t imagine it is) where do we go from here? How do we improve the chances that writing remains a sustainable profession – especially for the people who are just getting in?
GR: Let me answer as much as I can, and start with #1. I apologize if this is long, but it’s a lot of information.
First, the history. Residuals didn’t exist at the beginning of movies or television. Every advance in payment to writers has been the result of a labor struggle. Movies were originally written under studio contracts and the companies owned everything for the weekly salary and the writer got no more money, mostly because the movies were never intended to be shown anywhere other than in a movie theater. The first Guild agreements in features only provided for minimums for services and credits. When the first WGA television agreement was negotiated in 1953 (years after writers had already been writing), it provided for an additional payment for additional runs of that program, but only for the first 5 reruns. The reason there were residuals at all came from the idea that the producer was, in essence, getting multiple shows for one payment, as the show was already produced and could be “rerun” and additional money could be made from those additional runs of the show. It was viewed that the value of that show would be significantly reduced after multiple airings, so only 5 reruns were payable. (Reruns became payable in perpetuity in 1977.)
It’s very important to note that, at the time, the television production companies could not be owned by networks, so there had to be a line between the network that licensed the shows and sold advertising time and the production company that licensed to the network. Also important historically is that the tradition in licenses was that the network got two runs for its initial license (once for the network premiere and once for the rerun later in the season), and it would have to pay the production company more if it wanted to air the show a third time. Therefore, the idea of television residuals was that the production company was making additional money for each additional run and didn’t have to pay any additional production costs, so could pass some of that money over to the writers, actors and directors.
Then you get to theatricals being shown on television. This was one of the reasons for the 6-month strike in 1960. The unions (including the WGA) had been clear in the 1950s when movies were being run on TV that more money was due to the writers, actors and directors.
The Companies said, “We own these movies and can do whatever we want. You’re not entitled to anything.” Jack Warner famously said, “I don’t pay the plumber every time I flush the toilet, so I don’t have to pay you.” (A paraphrase.) The WGA and SAG won their strikes and got a percentage of the license fee the movie company received from the networks (again, separate entities).
AB: Okay, I’m starting to see why there isn’t just one simple catch-all formula. It’s because each time we had to fight for a residual, we were talking to different people, who had a different business model, or their books looked different, so they didn’t agree that someone else’s formula could apply to them.
GR: Right. It’s also because the reuse of theatricals and the reuse of television shows were so very different in business terms. What came out of the 1960 strike, though, was the idea that if the production company that hired the talent made more money selling a show in another medium, the talent was also entitled to more. Each new market created a different calculation (DVDs are a very different formula than Pay TV), but there are essentially two kinds of payments:
1. A flat payment based on a set WGA residual base. The payment depends on where the show is now exhibited and how and when it had previously been exhibited (these are known as “flat” residuals, since they’re set amounts), and
2. A percentage of the amount of money received by the production company for the exploitation in the market after the initial market for which it was produced (these are known as “gross-based” residuals, since they’re based on amounts actually received).
Theatrical residuals are fairly simple. Talent doesn’t get any more money for the movie until it leaves the theater. If the movie is the biggest box office success in the world, no more money is due the talent under a union contract. If the movie thereafter goes to any service – free television, pay cable, streaming, etc., the talent gets a percentage of the license fee for showing it on that service. If the service is owned by the production company, those fees are imputed and audited (the unions make sure the amount of the license is a fair one). If the movie is available to sell – DVD, download-to-own, etc. – there is a complicated formula with an even more complicated labor history, but the payment is based solely on the amount of money the consumer actually paid to buy the movie.
Television residuals are much more complicated, but there will always only be one of those two formulas: the flat payment based on the particular use or a percentage of the revenue received by the production company (or imputed for a vertically integrated transaction).
For example, if a network prime time show is written, the writer receives an additional payment of a set amount for the rerun on the network, then decreasing percentages of that amount when it airs off the network but on free television (say, syndication). If that same episode is sold to basic cable, the writer gets a percentage of the license fee. That payment covers many runs on the basic cable service, and if the show is sold to a streaming service, the writer gets a percentage of the license fee.
Selling network shows to the free television syndication market used to be a huge part of the television business and the production companies were willing to bear the cost of flat residuals when there was a large upside in the money to be made in syndication sales for even semi-successful shows. A production company usually gets a license fee from the network that does not cover the cost of production, and bears that deficit in the hopes that the series will sell for enough money in syndication to cover the costs and then some. But over the past few decades, with the growth of the cable reuse market (first basic cable, then pay, then streaming), only the most successful shows are generating high license fees, like “Friends” or “Big Bang Theory,” and the license fees for marginal shows might not even cover the flat residuals due the talent. It’s more likely that those shows will be sold to cable or streaming, where the production company just has to pay a percentage of the license fee to the talent. The strike in 1985 was primarily about the Companies demanding a break in one-hour residuals since they just could not get enough money in syndication to make it worthwhile and the Guilds have all given waivers since then as the problem increases.
AB: That’s interesting too, and something we always have to be aware of. There are scenarios where a flat fee residual actually doesn’t pencil out for them, so they don’t resell the show and no one wins. I’m not saying we have to help them get rich, but it’s good to know what scenario might cause them to stop rerunning a show. But setting that aside, it’s safe to say we’re stuck with a patchwork of definitions and formulas that we have to keep adjusting.
GR: And why is it like this? Because as each new medium develops, the unions have to figure out how to get money for their members based on that new business model, and likely before everyone really knows how that business model will work. There was a 17-week strike in 1981 (first WGA, then SAG joined), to figure out how to cover writers (and actors) in the new market of “made for pay television” (programs made for HBO, Showtime, etc.) They had to establish what to pay as a minimum, how to account for “reuse” and what constituted a “reuse” in a made-for-pay world. The market was new then, so people were making predictions about how the money would be made, but if you wait to see how the market works before coming up with a formula, you get left behind. The WGA has tried to adjust its made-for-pay formula in every subsequent negotiation, but it’s very difficult to change a formula you struck for.
When production intended for initial exhibition on basic cable started in the early 80s, production was very low budget, so the new basic cable provisions allowed for lower minimums and much lower residuals than free television. Those provisions were based on the idea that advertising rates were much lower in basic cable, so revenue was lower, so residuals had to be lower.
Programs made for streaming have their own challenges, of course, because residuals are always based on the production company getting more money for new media or new uses. The basis of the business model in streaming is that no more money is coming in to the production company for the life of the license. Whatever XYZ, Inc. (not a real company) makes in producing a show for Netflix, for example, that’s all they get for the entire license period. If XYZ, Inc. (the WGA signatory) doesn’t get any more money, how does the talent get more money? If Netflix includes an advertising tier, but XYZ, Inc. doesn’t share in that, how can the unions require XYZ, Inc. to pay more? (I’m not saying there aren’t potential solutions, I’m explaining the difficulties.)
The exhibitors (NBC, CBS, ABC, HBO, Netflix) are not at the bargaining table as the networks, but as the employing production entities. The companies that sign the collective bargaining agreements are not the corporate entities that exhibit the shows, so while writers want to make CBS pay more if they get more for ads, or Netflix gets more subscribers, that’s not the way the system was set up, and it would not be easy to change that. (I’m not saying something can’t be done, I’m saying it’s been tried and no union has yet succeeded.)
GR: The issue is made even worse by the concept known as “pattern bargaining.” The companies are really unwilling to give different formulas to each of the talent unions. That’s because of administrative issues, but also because that’s their answer to one union trying to make a better deal: “If I give it to you, I have to give it to them, and I can’t afford this across the board.” Each union can (and will) ask for a different provision, but it’s not easy to achieve.
I have often said the union agreements are similar to buying a little house in the 1950s and adding a room every time you have a new kid, or Mom comes to live with the family, and you look at the house years later and say, “Man, I would not have built this house this way if I’d known everything I know now.” If you were to want to start afresh and create a more coherent and cohesive system, it would have to be done as a joint effort with the DGA and SAG-AFTRA and it would have to be a system that is objective and simple to administer.
Hope this is clear. I think that sets us up for questions. There’s a lot of information here, and I may have used jargon or lingo specific to my experience, so if anyone wants just to ask what something means, I can answer that as well.
AB: I’m glad you brought up the Netflix thing because it’s super confusing and other writers have been asking about it. Netflix now has an ad-supported tier, but they still charge the consumer for it. So for the purpose of our formulas, reuse on Netflix’s ad tier is irrelevant, right? It’s still just regular Netflix SVOD? A better example might be Peacock. They have a free-to-consumer ad-suported tier, which you would think is AVOD, and they also have a paid subscription tier, which is SVOD. So when Universal makes MacGruber and runs it on Peacock, how are we calculating that?
GR: That’s correct, currently an additional tier on Netflix with ads doesn’t matter, since the consumer pays in any event (just different amounts) and residuals are based on whether or not the viewer has to pay to get the program. As to Peacock, the parties specifically negotiated about how residuals would be payable, for the reasons you state. Right now, even though there are multiple tiers, including a free-to-consumer one, MacGruber would be treated as produced for a streaming service where the consumer pays because (1) that’s primarily Peacock’s business model and (2) that classification yields the highest payment to the writers. The issue about streaming residuals and multiple tiers will undoubtedly be discussed with all of the unions in the upcoming negotiations.
AB: Okay, I hope my scenario questions aren’t boring, because I have to ask about one more. There’s this thing we all just read about last week. Warner pulls a bunch of shows off HBO and we now know that they did it in order to make new deals with Roku and Tubi. What the hell does this mean for the writers of those shows? If I wrote an episode of Westworld, I got paid initially for a Pay Cable show. Then it’s streaming on HBO Max, which, I already don’t know which formula that is. Either I’m getting 1.2% of what HBO Max “paid” to Warner, or I’m getting the SVOD rate? Then they pull it off the service and do some sort of deal with Roku and Tubi, and it’s going to run with ads, but I don’t know what happens to me? Are Roku and Tubi licensing the show from Warner? And do I get a percentage of that fee? From what I read, there are now going to be several Warner AVOD streaming “channels” inside the Tubi app. So for the purpose of me getting paid, is Warner now the streamer? Just streaming through someone else’s app? Or am I getting that crazy-ass AVOD rate, which is like 5% of some low number every 26 weeks? I mean, who paid who for the show, who are the advertisers writing their checks to, and where am I in this?
GR: Good question about Westworld as it shows how complicated this all is. Westworld is a series produced for HBO. That means it’s treated as high-budget made-for-pay cable. The made-for-pay residuals are a set payment per year for each year it is exhibited on the service. That also allows HBO to make the show available on their OTT service (HBO Max) for no additional money. When that show goes off HBO or HBO Max (which also saves them from having to pay the residual for it being available on the service), the production company (Warner Bros. Television) pays the writers a percentage of the license fee received for licensing to that other service. If the show had been initially produced for HBO Max, it would have been treated as SVOD and the release to Roku and Tubi would also generate a percentage of the license fee. The AVOD number (5.5% of minimum) is for programs produced for television (not streaming or pay) where the AVOD streaming is in conjunction with the airing of the episode on television. The basic rule is that the money received by the exhibitor (ad money, subscriber monies) is the exhibitor’s to keep and isn’t factored into any union-required payments, the negotiated payments are based on the money generated by the deal between the exhibitor and the distributor. The unions try to work out an imputed fee as to what that license would or should be when the exhibitor and distributor are owned by the same company (Warner Bros. Television and HBO, for example), but the talent’s money is not based on how much advertising revenue the network receives. Roku pays Warner Bros. Television for the right to exhibit Westworld, and no matter how much Roku makes (from advertisers, subscribers or something else), the amount of that license is all the writer’s payment is based on.
ANGELA WORKMAN: Grace, thank you so much for such detailed answers. I think you might have answered my sole question, which is about theatrical features that are sold to pay cable. I had a theatrically released film (2017) go to HBO, I received some very lovely, surprisingly large checks that kept doubling, for about 4-5 quarters. And then they abruptly stopped. Universal/Focus stopped paying out entirely. I was told by guild reps that Universal had overpaid me by some weird amount (six thousand four hundred and something - this after a low-six figure residual total). They said I would receive residuals again once I broke even, which thankfully happened just a few quarters ago. It took four years. I was told, when I inquired as to how and why I was overpaid (I wanted proof! I wanted those checks to keep coming!) that it was ok, this happens sometimes, no audit was needed, and that I should trust the studio. I was told this several times. I was, and remain, skeptical. But I think you’re saying that, yes, in fact, we should trust studios to pay us the residuals they owe us?
GR: There are a few responses to this. First, I am not suggesting just to trust the studios. If there are questions, please ask the Residuals department and make sure they are checking for accuracy. I am suggesting, though, that if there’s an error you might not assume it’s intentional or venal. In your case, this is not an uncommon error and it is easy to check the license agreement to ensure the payment is accurate. But let’s discuss what might have happened on your movie as an example. Say the production company (Universal) licensed the movie to a cable service (HBO in this case) for $10,000 for a period of 10 years. The license fee may actually be paid out 10% per year, so Universal actually receives only $1,000 per year from HBO, and only has to pay the writer $12 per year. If the residuals administrator at Universal misreads the license agreement and pays the residuals for the first 5 years up front in error (a total of $60), they’re not asking for money back, but the WGA Agreement provides that the Company can withhold payment until you are due more money (starting again in the 6th year). I understand the skepticism, but no audit is necessary; this is a simple issue of obtaining the license agreement, seeing that the license fee (in my example) is a total of $10,000 and reviewing how the payments have been made to date. There isn’t a lot of opportunity for dishonesty.
AW: At last! Some clarity! I appreciate this so much, thank you, Grace.
SARAH CONRADT: I hope you don’t mind being inundated with questions like this, but I had a situation with a Quibi to Roku scenario, and even reading through everything here, I still don’t understand the answer I received from the Guild when I asked… I wrote original episodes for a Quibi anthology and when Roku purchased all of Quibi’s library and made it available for streaming viewing, another Quibi writer received payment at the time for his original Quibi feature that he was told was some kind of residual/share of the licensing fee? - and he encouraged me to go after mine. I contacted the Guild and was told no, there was no residual or payment schedule which Roku was obligated to follow so there was no residual/fee for writers whose features/episodes were purchased and subsequently aired by Roku. So I saw not a penny and there was nothing to be done about it. How can that be?
GR: As to Quibi/Roku, it is really hard to answer without knowing more facts, because it depends on the budget. It also depends on the oddity that Roku bought the entire library, and that sale alone does not generate residuals. The WGA would have more information about the use and the sale. I would think they should be treating any additional use as a continuation of exhibition on the same streaming service as it was originally produced and whatever residuals that would apply in that circumstance (if they do) would apply to you. But I really don’t know enough about the sale of Quibi or your particular situation.
MARC GUGGENHEIM: Thank you indeed, Grace. You have a gift for explaining this arcane and exceedingly complex material in a way that gives everyone at a decent shot at understanding it. To go back to streaming TV for a moment, at the risk of being reductive, it sounds like there are two problems that need to be addressed: (a) devising/adjusting a residual formula that fairly compensates writers for the use of their work and (b) enforcement of that formula through access to actual data (number of streams, ad sales, subscriptions, etc.). In thinking about this, my focus has been on the latter – getting data from the streamers which is harder than pulling teeth – and wanted to get your thoughts on the best way to achieve that. Is that something we can only get through the MBA (and, therefore, a likely strike) or are there legal or auditing options available to us?
GR: Getting data from streamers is and will remain a challenge. The information is proprietary to the services and they have, thus far, been unwilling to share it with anyone. Everybody wants it for their own reasons and they just don’t want to give up the data. I’m not saying the union can’t ask, but the parties at the table make clear that they are only there in their capacity for the production company that employs the talent, and not the streaming services themselves. Therefore, I don’t know how to force the production company to get data it cannot get for itself.
Also, the streaming service knows you want the information to base your residuals on how well the program does, so even if they were willing to provide any information and potentially agree to increase payments for successful shows, it would likely be a condition of any deal that there would be a significant reduction in residuals for those programs that don’t perform well (this is what they’ve argued in the past). Right now, payment is due for the right to have it on the platform regardless of how many people watch it. Any change to base payment on success will also include a demand that a show that doesn’t perform doesn’t require additional payment.
The simplicity of the free television residual is what you want -- writer gets $X when the program runs for the Nth time on free television. It’s a set amount of money, easy to calculate, no audit necessary (an outside service can confirm what run the show is on) and you know you’ll get more money when it runs again. But the difficulty is that the new business models don’t work that way -- there’s no such thing as a “run” on a streaming service, you don’t even know how many minutes someone has to watch to call it “viewed” (if/when they tell you how many unique viewers there have been). There’s also not much more money to the production company after the initial license, so the streamers will have to agree to pay any additional residuals due under any new formula. That’s what I mean by fair compensation and easy enforcement.
The unions are either going to get this information from the streamers or they aren’t. If they do, the issue will be how to create a formula that is easy to administer and provides reward for successful shows. If the unions don’t get the information, the question will be if there are alternative ways to measure what would be additional payments in the traditional model (similar to “runs” or “supplemental markets”).
FLINT WAINESS: Two really fascinating things here that jumped out at me. 1) that the AMPTP is at the table representing motion picture and television producers, not the streamers themselves, even though the streamers are members, and thus asking for proprietary streaming data is likely a non-starter. Can you break down who the AMPTP is actually representing and what that means a little more for us? 2) the idea that the current made for streaming TV residual formula, while frustrating for writers on hit shows that are receiving the same residuals as writers on lightly sampled shows, does have the distinct benefit (like the broadcast/cable re-air residual formulal) of not requiring data or audits. In other words, even if we could get the streamers to share their data, it might be more headache than solution. Am I getting that right?
GR: To be clear, this matter as to what entities are at the table has been an issue for many years. The people negotiating directly with the unions are, while they are sitting at the table, representing only the companies that hire the members represented by the talent unions. That means that is the company that decides whether Writer A will get hired or Writer B, how much Writer A will get paid and what guarantees Writer A will get. That company then negotiates separately with an exhibitor (network, streamer, etc.) for that exhibitor to pay the production company to put the movie in theaters or license it to HBO or put it on ABC. The people at the table represent CBS Productions that hires the showrunner and everyone on the resulting production, or Walt Disney Pictures that hires the screenwriter and the director actors of the new movie, or Netflix’s production entity that buys the underlying rights and engages all of the cast and crew. These people are negotiating agreements with the unions on behalf of the employing companies as to the minimum terms and conditions that will apply to all of those circumstances. The union can only negotiate with the entity hiring the members as that is the entity that signs and negotiates the collective bargaining agreement. The union can ask to have the exhibitors at the table and negotiate elements that will apply to them (providing data, that they’ll exhibit series that have been produced, anything like that), but the exhibitors are under no contractual obligation to participate. The companies that sign the MBA do have to participate in order to get a successor agreement.
Regarding streaming information, I don’t want to say that there are not perfectly reasonable residuals provisions that could be formulated from reliable data, but I do think that sometimes getting that data and agreeing on what it means (is someone watching a program only for 2 minutes worth the same as the same person who watches it 5x in a row?) makes any resulting residual a great deal of work, with a lot of room for ambiguity. It may be a lot of headaches and the money received from such a formula will have to be greater than the amount paid for enforcement to make it worth it. It may be more efficient and get more money in writers’ pockets faster if it were less ambitious and more enforceable. But reasonable minds can differ on that, and I leave it to the negotiators.
AB: Grace, we can’t thank you enough for doing this. I’ll make this the last question, but I’m really curious, when you moved from the guild side of the table to the studio side, were there any surprises? Was it a big adjustment? Or is there anything you want to report back to us from “the other side?”
GR: Before I worked at a production company, I had always heard that the companies didn’t want to pay writers, they made it up in the “float” (that the companies made money by holding on to the money that is owed), and they did everything they could not to pay writers on time, including residuals. I went to work at a few production companies and I can say quite freely that is simply not true. They want to pay what they owe, they want to pay promptly and, for all practical purposes, have no interest in the “float” at all. They want to expend as little time and as few resources as possible to make the requisite payments and then move on. The problem often with residuals payments (since we’re discussing residuals) is there is no incentive for the company to provide the residuals department with the most cutting edge programs nor do they feel a need to fully staff the department -- they don’t want to spend millions to make sure the residuals payments are out and on time when that money could be spent on departments that could bring in more revenue. But they have every interest in paying the required residuals and supplemental market payments, since there are late fees if they don’t. There’s a loss of staff time if there are claims. I just paid my credit card bill. I know I need to pay on time, I know I need to pay it before they hit me with late fees, so I don’t pay it joyfully, I just pay it because I owe it. Residuals are like that; the companies pay because they know they owe it, and they don’t want to put all of their resources into it. If the overall residuals systems were easier, Companies would make the required payments and those payments might be processed faster simply because the few people on staff handling it could figure out the payments quickly. But processing a single television movie payment or an episode of television actually takes some work and it’s just not easy.
There was a single payment plan negotiated in the 1960s, the Royalty Plan. Under that plan, after the first two network runs, television writers would get a percentage of all revenue the production company received for the licensing of the television show, in perpetuity, regardless of the method of reuse. It didn’t work then (mostly because it required the writers to forego the second network run residual and they didn’t like that) and it wouldn’t work now, mostly because the revenue for subsequent uses on related platforms (Hulu and Disney+ and ABC are all connected) can’t be assessed and would have to be negotiated in any event. It’s a goal to search for a simple, objective and fair plan that rewards in success, but it is not easy given the current business models and the general unwillingness of the streamers to share information.
AB: Thank you again for spending so much time on this, Grace. And for those reading, you can show Grace some love on Twitter here: @GraceReiner. I’ll add, like I did last time, that the WGA Residuals Department is really helpful and you can call them or email them with questions. Their contact info is on the WGA website. As always, if you’d like to participate in one of these discussions, just reply email us at writerscollectivesubstack@gmail.com. Have a great weekend and we’ll be back soon!